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MUTUAL FUNDS-TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES-Capital 
Gains Distributions From Mutual Funds: 
Income or Principal? 
The growing prevalence of mutual fund shares in the assets of 
small and medium-sized estates has made the problem of allocating 
capital gains distributions ben\Teen income and principal a matter 
of great concern to the trustees of such estates.1 A "capital gains" 
I. The mutual fund is an open-ended investment company in which shareholders 
contribute capital in return for shares in the fund. The professional security brokers 
who manage the fund use the capital to purchase securities. The main activity of the 
fund is the trading of such securities. Investment policies and goals vary widely among 
various funds depending upon the investment motives of the shareholders. The fund 
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distribution represents a gain resulting from the profitable sale of 
securities held by the mutual fund. The uncertain state of the law 
regarding capital gains distributions from mutual funds presents a 
serious dilemma to the trustee: if he distributes the capital gains to 
the life beneficiary, the remainderman may claim that such distribu-
tions represent a partial liquidation of the fund and therefore are 
allocable to the principal of the estate; if he allocates the distribution 
to principal, the life beneficiaries may claim that the distributions 
are the result of the normal operations of the fund and consequently 
represent income. Recent decisions and legislation indicate a trend 
toward resolving this issue by allocating capital gains distributions 
to principal.2 This solution seems unsatisfactory for it fails to con-
sider the essential characteristics of mutual funds and their distribu-
tions. 
The recent case of In re Estate of Brock3 is illustrative of the 
problem involved in allocating capital gains distributions. Testator 
had provided in his will that the income from his estate was to go 
to various life beneficiaries and, upon their deaths, the principal was 
to be distributed to the two institutions named as remaindermen. 
The trustee used part of the proceeds of the estate to purchase shares 
in a mutual fund and when the mutual fund made a distribution, a 
question arose as to whether it represented income, allocable to the 
life beneficiaries, or principal, allocable to the remaindermen. In 
affirming the decision of the Orphan's Court, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that distributions from a mutual fund to a trust 
should be treated as if the trustee had held the securities owned by 
the mutual fund and that therefore a capital gains distribution repre-
sented a return of principal which should be allocated to the remain-
derman. 
The majority opinion in Brock adopted the "conduit" theory, 
which is the theory most frequently advanced in support of the propo-
sition that capital gains distributions from mutual funds are to be 
treated as a return of principal.4 The basis of this theory is that the 
derives its income from both dividends on securities held and profits realized on the 
trading of securities. See generally WIFSENBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES (pt. I) (25th 
Annual ed. 1965). 
Mutual funds are an excellent investment for the trustee of an estate with limited 
resources because they allow him to invest in reasonably high yield securities and at 
the same time enjoy the safety of diversification which he could not otherwise afford. 
Such funds also have the advantage of minimizing the administrative efforts needed 
by the estate, while providing constant supervision of the funds invested. See generally 
Putney, Mutual Funds Make Small Trusts Possible, 89 TRusrs &: EsrATES 836 (1950). 
2. E.g., Tait v. Peck, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707 (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. 
§ 3A:14A-5 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 27-E-7; REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL 
AND INCOME ACT § 6(c) (1962). 
3. 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281 {1966). 
4. See generally Note, 1964 DuKE L.J. 650. 
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mutual fund is a mere conduit for the securities held by it and that 
therefore the trustee should treat the proceeds from the fund as 
if he had held the securities in his own name.5 This theory, however, 
fails to consider two basic characteristics of the mutual fund. First, 
the mutual fund is closely managed by professionals in the invest-
ment industry and therefore it is reasonable to expect far different 
results than would be obtained from a similar investment under 
the casual management of a trustee. Second, the mutual fund is set 
up as a corporate entity and, as in any other corporation, the stock-
holders do not have a claim to any specific asset but rather have a 
claim only to a part of the corporation's equity.6 Proponents of the 
"conduit" theory point to the fact that the Internal Revenue Code 
follows this theory in allowing mutual fund shareholders to treat 
distributions from the fund as if they had held the securities them-
selves.7 However, the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of mutual 
fund distributions is based on the policy that mutual fund share-
holders should not be taxed twice on the earnings of the fund8-a 
policy which has no bearing on the problem of trust allocation of 
mutual fund distributions and was never intended as a guideline 
for the law of trusts.9 
It has also been argued by those advocating the allocation of 
capital gains distributions to the remainderman that such distribu-
tions are the result of a diminution of the mutual fund assets and 
therefore represent a reduction in the corpus of the estate.10 They 
point out that if a trustee were to sell mutual fund shares just prior 
to a capital gains distribution, the entire proceeds of the sale would 
be allocable to the corpus of the estate because the sale would rep-
resent a liquidation of estate assets, although the price received for 
the shares would reflect the expected dividend.11 Indeed, the price 
5. If a trustee for an estate held the securities himself, the only way he could 
realize a capital gain would be to sell the securities at a profit. Such a sale would be a 
liquidation of trust assets and the proceeds would be allocated to the corpus. 
6. For criticism of the reasoning used by proponents of the conduit theory, see 
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 858 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; Young, 
A Dissent on Capital Gains Distributions, 88 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 280 (1949). 
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 852, provides that an investment company which 
distributes at least 90% of its taxable income will not be taxed on such income. Instead, 
the shareholder will be taxed as if he held the securities himself. That is, the distribu-
tions representing income from dividends will be taxed as normal income and the 
portion of the distribution designated capital gains will be taxed at the long term 
capital gains rate. 
8. See Union Trusted Funds, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1133, (1947). See generally 
Rubin, Regulated Investment Companies, 28 TAXES 541 (1950). 
9. See generally BOGERT § 858; Anderson, Principal or Income, 90 TRUSTS &: EsrATES 
530 (1951). 
10. See Shattuck, Capital Gains Distributions, Principal or Income, 88 TRUSTS &: 
EsTAn:s 160 (1949). 
11. It should be noted that the bulk of transactions in any type of corporation will 
involve a reduction in corporate assets. However, normal operations usually involve 
only a reduction of current operating assets and depreciation of noncurrent assets, 
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of any corporate stock tends to rise just prior to a dividend distribu-
tion-which dividends would clearly have to be allocated to income 
-and if the trustee were to liquidate his shares in the company, this 
increase in value also would have to be allocated to the corpus of 
the estate. However, repeated action of this type would constitute a 
breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to the income beneficiary.12 
Finally, it has been claimed that it is unfair to credit the life 
tenant with all of the gains of the mutual fund, while the remain-
derman suffers all of the administrative costs,13 losses, and risks of 
loss. However, this argument is only partially valid. Since only net 
capital gains of the mutual fund for the period are distributed,14 the 
remainderman would suffer only if, in a given period, the losses 
exceeded the gains. Furthermore, in the type of mutual fund that the 
trustee would be required by law to invest in,15 the chances of loss 
are minimized and the long run increase in the value of the shares 
should be more than sufficient to cover administrative costs and 
losses.16 
A major goal of any court decision or legislation dealing with the 
problem of allocating mutual fund capital gains distributions between 
principal and income should be to give effect to the intent of the 
testator wherever possible.17 Under circumstances similar to those 
presented in Brock, where the life beneficiaries are friends and rela-
tives of the testator and the remaindermen are institutions, it could 
normally be assumed that the testator's main concern in establishing 
such a trust was for the welfare of the life beneficiaries. The trustee, 
therefore, should be allowed to make investments which will maxi-
mize income for the life beneficiary, so long as he adequately protects 
the principal for the remainderman. Under a decision such as Brock, 
the diversification and professional management aspects of a mutual 
fund would provide adequate protection for the remainderman,18 
but the goal of income maximization would not be realized since the 
dividend income from a mutual fund is only about 2.55 per cent per 
whereas liquidating transactions involve a reduction by sale of the capital or non-
current assets. Therefore much of the issue in dispute actually revolves around the 
question of whether securities held by a mutual fund constitute current operating 
assets or capital non-current assets. See generally Young, A Dissent on Capital Gains 
Distributions, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 280 (1949). 
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 185, 187 (1959). 
13. The principal bears the investment costs: BOGERT § 803, at 142-43; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 233, comment f (1959); REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME 
Acr § 13(c)(2)(a) (1962). 
14. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 852(3)(c). 
15. A trustee should choose an investment fund which balances growth and income 
producing factors with relative safety to the investment. Security Trust Co. v. Mahoney, 
307 Ky. 661, 668-69, 212 S.W .2d 115, 119 (1948). 
16. See note 21 infra and accompanying text. 
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS§ 4, comment a (1959). 
18. See notes 1 & 15 supra. 
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year.19 On the other hand, if capital gains distributions as well as 
dividend income were allocated to the life beneficiary, his yield from 
the mutual fund would be approximately 5 per cent20-certainly a 
reasonable rate of return. It should also be noted that under present 
economic conditions, the remainderman stands to gain by an invest-
ment in a mutual fund, even if the capital gains distributions are allo-
cated to the life beneficiary, for the value of the shares of the mutual 
fund itself tend to increase in value after the distribution of the 
capital gains, thus increasing the corpus of the estate.21 
Recently enacted and proposed legislation has, however, taken 
the position that capital gains distributions from a mutual fund 
should be treated as principal. Section 5(1) of the 1931 Uniform 
Principal and Income Act provides that if a trustee has an option of 
receiving either cash or shares of stock, he should treat the distribu-
tion as income. Relying upon this section, a majority of the courts 
had reached the conclusion that capital gains distributions of a 
mutual fund were income.22 However, section 6(c) of the 1962 Re-
vised Uniform Principal and Income Act, augmenting section 5(1) 
of the earlier act, specifically states that capital gains distributions 
from mutual funds must be treated as principal, 23 thus reversing 
19. This figure represents the average rate of return for the five years ending July, 
1966, on the fifty mutual funds listed in Lonr:s Index of Mutual Funds, 105 TRusrs 8: 
EsTATES 798 (1966). Since investments which are equally sound, such as high grade 
corporation bonds, could produce returns of 4 ½% or better for the income beneficiary, 
the trustee might be held liable to the income beneficiary for a breach of trust. See 
Moody's Bond Yields by Rating Groups (especially tables on Aaa and Aa Bonds) -in 
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL a20-a21 Gune 1966 ed.). 
20. The average capital gains distribution from mutual funds for the years 1956 
through 1965 was approximately 2.58% of invested capital per year. However, it should 
be noted that capital gains distributions tend to fluctuate considerably from year 
to year; of the ten years surveyed, capital gains distributions ranged from a high of 
3,3% of invested capital in 1957 to a low of 1.9% of invested capital in 1963. All 
figures were compiled from Statistical Summary of Open Ended Investment Companies 
(Mutual Funds), in MOODY'S BANK 8: FINANCE MANUAL a52 (1966 ed.). 
21. The 36 mutual funds listed in Comparison of Management's Performance of 
Open-end Investment Companies, in MOODY'S BANK 8: FINANCE MANUAL a48 (1966), 
realized an average appreciation in their per share value of 140.6% after dividend and 
capital gains distributions, for the ten-year period from 1956 to 1965. 
22. E.g., Rosenberg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960); Coates v. Coates, 
304 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957); Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. 8: C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 
1951), However, some courts have interpreted capital gains distributions as a disburse-
ment of corporate assets allocable to the remainderman under § 5(3) of this act. E.g., 
Tait v. Peck, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707 (1963); Estate of Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 
A.2d 218 (1966). 
23. REvlsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Am: § 6(c) (1962) provides: 
Distributions made from ordinary income by a regulated investment company ••• 
are income. All other distributions made by the company or trust, including dis-
tributions from capital gains, ••• whether in the form of cash or an option to take 
new stock or cash or an option to purchase additional shares, are principal. 
See Barclay, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 101 TRUSTS 8: EsTATES 833 
(1962). For a criticism of this section see Bogert, The Revised Uniform Principal and 
Income Act, 38 NOTRE DAME I.Aw. 50 (1962). To date the Revised Act has been adopted 
in six states: Michigan, Maryland, ·wyoming, South Carolina, Kansas, and New York. 
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the results reached by a majority of the courts under the old act.24 
The courts and legislatures have invoked several mechanical rules 
in order to arrive at a fair and workable method of distributing 
capital gains income. First, the Pennsylvania rule-the so-called 
"rule of fairness" which is no longer followed by the courts25-was 
based on the assumption that the settlor intended to treat the in-
come beneficiary and the remainderman equally. Under this rule, 
regular cash dividends were allocated to income, but a capital gains 
dividend by a mutual fund was considered an "apportionable event." 
The trustee was to determine what portion of the capital gains 
dividend was attributable to the retained earnings of the fund since 
the inception of the trust or the trust's purchase of the mutual fund 
shares, and this portion was to be allocated to the income benefi-
ciaries while the residual was allocated to the remaindermen. How-
ever, the difficulty of this rule was that it presented impossible ac-
counting problems in that it required the trustee to trace the source 
of all capital gains distributions.26 Second, the Massachusetts "rule 
of simplicity" was, until recently, the rule followed in most jurisdic-
tions27 and variations of it have been incorporated into both the 
Uniform Principal and Income Act and the Revised Uniform Prin-
cipal and Income Act. This rule favored the life beneficiary by 
treating all mutual fund cash dividends from whatever source as 
income28 and all dividends paid in stock as principal. If the trustee 
24. NEW YoRK PERS. PROP. LAw § 27-5-7, which became effective in June 1965, uses 
language which is almost identical to that found in § 6(c) of the Revised Principal and 
Income Act. The law represents a statutory reversal of a long line of New York deci-
sions which had held capital gains to be income to the life beneficiary. E.g., Matter of 
Hurd, 203 Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Matter of Bruce, 192 Misc. 523, 
81 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Matter of Byrne, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. 
Ct. 1948). 
25. Originating with Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857), this rule was followed by a 
majority of jurisdictions prior to 1935. See BOGERT § 842; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 236.15, {2d 
ed. 1956); Flinkinger, A Trustee's Nightmare: Allocation of Stock Dividends Between 
Income and Principal, 43 B.UL. REv. 199 (1963). See generally BoGERT §§ 846-48. 
26. If a trustee were to follow the Pennsylvania rule, every time a mutual fund made 
a capital gains distribution the trustee would have to analyze the fund's books to 
determine the date of purchase and cost of stock sold, as well as the date of sale and 
sale price. He would then have to calculate what portion of the capital gains resulting 
from sales during the period would be attributable to the income beneficiary. This 
task would prove impossible in the case of large mutual funds that regularly trade 
their securities. See In re Catherwood's Trust, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961): Note, 
Effectuating the Settlor's Intent: A Formula for Providing More Income for the Life 
Beneficiary, 33 U. Car. L. REv. 783, 785 (1966). 
27. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 108 (1868); see Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit &: 
Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935); In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 
N.W. 878 (1929); Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927); 
BOGERT § 850; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 236.3 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1965); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), 
TRUSTS § 236 (1959). 
28. It would appear, however, that if the cash dividend from a mutual fund were 
actually declared to be a liquidating dividend resulting from a termination of opera-
tions of the fund, the dividend would have to be treated as a return of principal. See 
Wehrhane v. Peyton, 133 Conn. 478, 52 A.2d 711 (1947) (dictum). 
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had an option to receive either cash or stock, the dividend was to 
be treated as income, regardless of how the trustee exercised his 
option.29 While this rule was easy to administer, it failed to consider 
the circumstances giving rise to the dividend.3° Finally, Delaware has 
adopted a "Prudent Man Rule"31 pursuant to which a trustee should 
treat corporate distributions as income to the extent that he believes 
such distributions would have been regarded as income by "men of 
prudence, discretion, and intelligence in the management of their 
own affairs."82 Under this rule, it is likely that a trustee would look 
upon capital gains distributions as income, but unfortunately the 
rule does not supply the trustee with very clear guidelines and this 
uncertainty is an open invitation for the disfavored party to bring 
suit to determine if the trustee has acted as a "prudent iµ.an.'' 83 
A better reasoned solution to this problem, one which was sug-
gested by the minority opinion in Brock, would be to treat capital 
gains dividends from a mutual fund as income to the life beneficiary. 
In reaching his conclusion, the dissenting judge in Brock relied on 
the stock-in-trade theory.84 He reasoned that a mutual fund is like 
any other business, that is, its normal operations are the buying and 
selling of securities, and that therefore the securities which it holds 
represent stock-in-trade or operating assets rather than capital as-
sets.85 It follows then that the income realized from the trading of 
these securities is income realized in the normal course of business 
and should be distributed as normal income. The professional man-
agement aspects of the mutual fund, its corporate structure, and the 
fact that securities behave much like any other commodity with 
fluctuating prices, are all factors which tend to substantiate this 
argument. 
The most satisfactory way to solve the question of capital gains 
distributions is to have the testator state specifically in his will how 
such distributions should be handled.86 Unfortunately too few testa-
29. See Smith v. Catting, 231 Mass. 42, 120 N.E. 177 (1918); R.EsTATEMENT {SECOND), 
TRUSTS § 236(c) (1959). 
!10. Thus one transaction could lead to two opposite results depending upon the 
method of payment chosen by the mutual fund. For example, if the fund realized a 
capital gain on the sale of a block of securities and chose to distribute the proceeds 
only in additional shares of its own stock, the proceeds would be treated as principal 
allocable to the remainderman under the Massachusetts rule. On the other hand, if 
the fund decided to distribute the gain from the same transaction in cash or gave the 
option of cash or shares in the fund, the Massachusetts rule would dictate that the 
proceeds be treated as income allocable to the life beneficiary. 
31. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 12, § 3526 (Supp. 1964). 
!12. Ibid. 
!Ill. For criticisms of this rule, see Dunham, Scott &: Wolf, Uniform Revised Princi-
pal and Income Act, 101 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 894, 896 (1962). 
34. 218 A.2d 281, 294 (Pa. 1966) (dissenting opinion). See generally Young, A Dissent 
on Capital Gains Distributions, 88 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 280 (1949). 
35. See note 11 supra. 
36. See generally Rogers, Capital Gains Distributions, Clauses to Eliminate Ques-
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tors foresee this problem and make adequate provisions for it. Uni-
form legislative action would be the most efficient and most certain, 
non-testamentary method of supplying the trustee with a concrete 
answer for his dilemma, but, unlike the Revised Uniform Principal 
and Income Act, such legislation must address itself to the practical 
circumstances surrounding mutual funds held by an estate which 
provides for both life beneficiaries and remaindermen. The history 
of this problem suggests that two features should be incorporated 
into such a statutory solution. First, a flexible,37 easily determinable 
upper limit, based on a reasonable rate of return for the period in-
volved, 38 should be placed on the amount of capital gains which can 
be allocated to the income beneficiary.39 Second, such a statute should 
provide that, if the mutual fund sustains a capital loss in any period, 
capital gains will not be distributed to income beneficiaries in follow-
ing periods unless and until the loss has been repaid to the principal. 
A statute which incorporates these provisions would be beneficial to 
all of the parties involved. The trustee would be given definite guide-
lines to follow and would therefore be free to take advantage of the 
opportunity to invest in mutual funds. The life beneficiary would 
realize a reasonable rate of return. Finally, some of the risk of loss 
would be shifted away from the remainderman and the chances for 
accretion to his principal would be increased. 
tions of Allocating Investment Company Dividends, 90 TRUSTS &: EsTATES 300 (1951); 
Rogers, Capital Gains Dividends, A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 
79 (1951). 
37. Since changes in economic conditions would tend to make obsolete any fixed 
limit, it is desirable to establish a flexible limit that will fluctuate to reflect economic 
conditions. The "6% Rule" and similar statutes recently adopted by several states to 
control the distribution of stock. dividends are examples of inflexible limitations. E.g., 
N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 3A:14A-4 (Supp. 1964); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW§ 27-e-2; PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 20, § 3470.5(1) (1964). 
38. Determining a satisfactory guidepost to be used in setting the upper limit would 
be the biggest obstacle in winning acceptance for a statute of this type. However, there 
appears to be a great number of readily ascertainable standards. One possible method 
might be to set the limit at ½% higheT than the yield for the period for a specific 
class of bonds which the trustee would have been permitted to invest in. A standard 
reporting system, such as Moody's Investor Yield Tables, see, e.g., notes 19-21 
supra, could be specified as the official source for such information. 
39. This limit should be measured against total distributions from the mutual 
fund, including both dividends and capital gains. But if the dividend distribution alone 
exceeded the limit, the entire amount would still be allocable to the income bene-
ficiary. 
